# 1NC

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### 1

#### Our interpretation is the aff has to defend instrumental implementation of an example of the resolutional statement

#### The resolution indicates affs should advocate topical government change

Ericson 2003

(Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### Statutory restrictions mandate government action

Kershner 2010

(Joshua, Articles Editor, Cardozo Law Review. J.D. Candidate (June 2011), Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, “Political Party Restrictions and the Appointments Clause: The Federal Election Commission's Appointments Process Is Constitutional” Cardozo Law Review de novo 2010 Cardozo L. Rev. De Novo 615)

The process by which the President fills an Executive Branch position is governed by the Appointments Clause: [The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. n81 This process is divided into three phases: (1) Congress creates an Executive Branch position by statute; n82 (2) the President nominates an individual to fill the position; n83 and (3) the Senate confirms the nominee. n84 The Clause covers a specified list of positions and the generic "other Officers of the United States." n85 The Clause controls who nominates, appoints, and confirms an individual for such a position. n86 Finally, the Clause defines a separate process for inferior officers. n87 It should be noted, however, that the Appointments Clause limits but does not empower Congress to create positions. n88 That power comes from the Necessary and Proper Clause. n89 The House of Representatives has no role in the process of nomination and appointment and is specifically not mentioned in the [\*626] Appointments Clause. All of the powers contained in the Appointments Clause are reserved to the President, the Senate, or both. n90 The Appointments Clause makes a distinction between the power to nominate and the separate power to appoint. The power of nomination is textually reserved to the President of the United States, n91 whereas the power of appointment is shared by the President and the Senate. n92 Statutory restrictions violate the plain text of the Appointments Clause because the very act of passing a statute requires the involvement of the House of Representatives. n93 Statutory restrictions on the appointments process are further problematic because the Appointments Clause's power to nominate is vested solely in the President. n94 Those statutory restrictions that limit the President's power to nominate violate the plain text of the Clause. n95 Where the Constitution provides a clear procedural process, the Supreme Court has consistently applied strict principles of formalism, construing the text so as to limit, rather than expand, the powers of the various branches of government. n96 The Senate's role in the appointments process is the final confirmation of a nominee. n97 The "advice and consent" of the Senate applies only to the appointment power. n98 The President and the Senate have interpreted advice as non-binding guidance, and have interpreted [\*627] consent as the act of confirmation. n99 Thus, the Appointments Clause gives the Senate only the narrow function of confirming nominees. n100

#### So do judicial restrictions

Singer 2007

(Jana, Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law, SYMPOSIUM A HAMDAN QUARTET: FOUR ESSAYS ON ASPECTS OF HAMDAN V. RUMSFELD: HAMDAN AS AN ASSERTION OF JUDICIAL POWER, Maryland Law Review 2007 66 Md. L. Rev. 759)

n25. See, e.g., Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) (noting the reluctance of courts "to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs"); see also Katyal, supra note 1, at 84 (noting that "in war powers cases, the passive virtues operate at their height to defer adjudication, sometimes even indefinitely"); Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 Yale L.J. 1255, 1313-17 (1988) (discussing the Court's use of justiciability doctrines to refuse to hear challenges to the President's authority in cases involving foreign affairs); Gregory E. Maggs, The Rehnquist Court's Noninterference with the Guardians of National Security, 74 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1122, 1124-38 (2006) (discussing the Rehnquist Court's general policy of nonintervention in cases concerning actions of governmental agencies and political entities in national security matters); Peter E. Quint, Reflections on the Separation of Powers and Judicial Review at the End of the Reagan Era, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 427, 433-34 (1989) (discussing the use of the political question doctrine as a means to avoid judicial restrictions on presidential power in cases involving military force).

#### Three reasons our interpretation is best

#### First is limits. Allowing affs that are only tangentially related to the topic allows an unlimited number of affs (prisons, immigration, etc) where the aff would always have the literature advantage. Even if they win that those affs are debatable, the aff would always have the literature and expertise advantage against impact turns to their aff. They also force the negative to engage in limitless research to prepare for every conceivable approach to the topic, making debate A) inaccessible to people that have to work for a living and B) even more biased toward schools with large coaching staffs.

#### Specific, limited resolutions ensure mutual ground which is key to sustainable controversy without sacrificing creativity or openness

Steinberg & Freeley 2008

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Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the **broad topic** of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as ~~human~~ beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. **Vague understanding** results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education **without** finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by **focus on a particular point of difference**, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Second is Education. Policy focus is key – disengagement from politics abdicates responsibility and decreases governmental responsibility – especially true for war powers

Mellor 2013

[Ewan, European University Institute, “Why policy relevance is a moral necessity: Just war theory, impact, and UAVs”, http://www.academia.edu/4175480/Why\_policy\_relevance\_is\_a\_moral\_necessity\_Just\_war\_theory\_impact\_and\_UAVs\]

This section of the paper considers more generally the need for just war theorists to engage with policy debate about the use of force, as well as to engage with the more fundamental moral and philosophical principles of the just war tradition. It draws on John Kelsay’s conception of just war thinking as being a social practice,35 as well as on Michael Walzer’s understanding of the role of the social critic in society.36 It argues that the just war tradition is a form of “practical discourse” which is concerned with questions of “how we should act.”37 Kelsay argues that: [T]he criteria of jus ad bellum and jus in bello provide a framework for structured participation in a public conversation about the use of military force . . . citizens who choose to speak in just war terms express commitments . . . [i]n the process of giving and asking for reasons for going to war, those who argue in just war terms seek to influence policy by persuading others that their analysis provides a way to express and fulfil the desire that military actions be both wise and just.38 He also argues that “good just war thinking involves continuous and complete deliberation, in the sense that one attends to all the standard criteria at war’s inception, at its end, and throughout the course of the conflict.”39 This is important as it highlights the need for just war scholars to engage with the ongoing operations in war and the specific policies that are involved. The question of whether a particular war is just or unjust, and the question of whether a particular weapon (like drones) can be used in accordance with the jus in bello criteria, only cover a part of the overall justice of the war. Without an engagement with the reality of war, in terms of the policies used in waging it, it is impossible to engage with the “moral reality of war,”40 in terms of being able to discuss it and judge it in moral terms. Kelsay’s description of just war thinking as a social practice is similar to Walzer’s more general description of social criticism. The just war theorist, as a social critic, must be involved with his or her own society and its practices. In the same way that the social critic’s distance from his or her society is measured in inches and not miles,41 the just war theorist must be close to and must understand the language through which war is constituted, interpreted and reinterpreted.42 It is only by understanding the values and language that their own society purports to live by that the social critic can hold up a mirror to that society to demonstrate its hypocrisy and to show the gap that exists between its practice and its values.43 The tradition itself provides a set of values and principles and, as argued by Cian O’Driscoll, constitutes a “language of engagement” to spur participation in public and political debate.44 This language is part of “our common heritage, the product of many centuries of arguing about war.”45 These principles and this language provide the terms through which people understand and come to interpret war, not in a deterministic way but by providing the categories necessary for moral understanding and moral argument about the legitimate and illegitimate uses of force.46 By spurring and providing the basis for political engagement the just war tradition ensures that the acts that occur within war are considered according to just war criteria and allows policy-makers to be held to account on this basis. Engaging with the reality of war requires recognising that war is, as Clausewitz stated, a continuation of policy. War, according to Clausewitz, is subordinate to politics and to political choices and these political choices can, and must, be judged and critiqued.47 Engagement and political debate are morally necessary as the alternative is disengagement and moral quietude, which is a sacrifice of the obligations of citizenship.48 This engagement must bring just war theorists into contact with the policy makers and will require work that is accessible and relevant to policy makers, however this does not mean a sacrifice of critical distance or an abdication of truth in the face of power. By engaging in detail with the policies being pursued and their concordance or otherwise with the principles of the just war tradition the policy-makers will be forced to account for their decisions and justify them in just war language. In contrast to the view, suggested by Kenneth Anderson, that “the public cannot be made part of the debate” and that “[w]e are necessarily committed into the hands of our political leadership”,49 it is incumbent upon just war theorists to ensure that the public are informed and are capable of holding their political leaders to account. To accept the idea that the political leadership are stewards and that accountability will not benefit the public, on whose behalf action is undertaken, but will only benefit al Qaeda,50 is a grotesque act of intellectual irresponsibility. As Walzer has argued, it is precisely because it is “our country” that we are “especially obligated to criticise its policies.”51

#### Decisionmaking skills gained from debate are key to problem solving in all facets of life—outweighs the case

Steinberg & Freeley 2008

 \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp. 9-10

If we assume it to be possible **without** recourse to violence to reach agreement on all the problems implied in the employment of the idea of justice we are granting the possibility of formulating an ideal of ~~man~~ and society, valid for all beings endowed with reason and accepted by what we have called elsewhere the universal audience.14 I think that the only discursive methods available to us stem from techniques that are not demonstrative—that is, conclusive and rational in the narrow sense of the term—but from argumentative techniques which are not conclusive but which may tend to demonstrate the reasonable character of the conceptions put forward. It is this recourse to the rational and reasonable for the realization of the ideal of universal communion that characterizes the age-long endeavor of all philosophies in their aspiration for a city of ~~man~~ in which violence may progressively give way to wisdom.13 Whenever an individual controls the dimensions of" a problem, he or she can solve the problem through a personal decision. For example, if the problem is whether to go to the basketball game tonight, if tickets are not too expensive and if transportation is available, the decision can be made individually. But if a friend's car is needed to get to the game, then that person's decision to furnish the transportation must be obtained. Complex problems, too, are subject to individual decision making. American business offers many examples of small companies that grew into major corporations while still under the individual control of the founder. Some computer companies that began in the 1970s as one-person operations burgeoned into multimillion-dollar corporations with the original inventor still making all the major decisions. And some of the multibillion-dollar leveraged buyouts of the 1980s were put together by daring—some would say greedy—financiers who made the day-to-day and even hour-to-hour decisions individually. When President George H. W. Bush launched Operation Desert Storm, when President Bill Clinton sent troops into Somalia and Haiti and authorized Operation Desert Fox, and when President George W. Bush authorized Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq, they each used different methods of decision making, but in each case the ultimate decision was an individual one. In fact, many government decisions can be made only by the president. As Walter Lippmann pointed out, debate is the only satisfactory way the exact issues can be decided: A president, whoever he is, has to find a way of understanding the novel and changing issues which he must, under the Constitution, decide. Broadly speaking ... the president has two ways of making up his mind. The one is to turn to his subordinates—to his chiefs of staff and his cabinet officers and undersecretaries and the like—and to direct them to argue out the issues and to bring him an agreed decision… The other way is to sit like a judge at a hearing where the issues to be decided are debated. After he has heard the debate, after he has examined the evidence, after he has heard the debaters cross-examine one another, after he has questioned them himself he makes his decision… It is a much harder method in that it subjects the president to the stress of feeling the full impact of conflicting views, and then to the strain of making his decision, fully aware of how momentous it Is. But there is no other satisfactory way by which momentous and complex issues can be decided.16 John F. Kennedy used Cabinet sessions and National Security Council meetings to provide debate to illuminate diverse points of view, expose errors, and challenge assumptions before he reached decisions.17 As he gained experience in office, he placed greater emphasis on debate. One historian points out: "One reason for the difference between the Bay of Pigs and the missile crisis was that [the Bay of Pig\*] fiasco instructed Kennedy in the importance of uninhibited debate in advance of major decision."18 All presidents, to varying degrees, encourage debate among their advisors. We may never be called on to render the final decision on great issues of national policy, but we are constantly concerned with decisions important to ourselves for which debate can be applied in similar ways. That is, this debate may take place in our minds as we weigh the pros and cons of the problem, or we may arrange for others to debate the problem for us. Because we all are increasingly involved in the decisions of the campus, community, and society in general, it is in our intelligent self-interest to reach these decisions through reasoned debate.

#### Third is ground, Topical fairness requirements are key to effective dialogue—monopolizing strategy and prep makes the discussion one-sided and subverts any meaningful neg role

Galloway 2007

(Ryan, professor of communications at Samford University, “Dinner And Conversation At The Argumentative Table: Reconceptualizing Debate As An Argumentative Dialogue”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28 2007, ebsco)

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure.¶ Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table.¶ When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. **Far from** being **a banal request for links** to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon **months of preparation**, research, and critical thinking not be silenced.¶ Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms **operate to exclude** particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning:¶ Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197).¶ **Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation** (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).¶ For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. **Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits** of topical advocacy.

### 2

#### Blurring the lines of identity can give a false sense of tolerance to violence caused by globalization and therefore create a corporate multiculturalism.

Hames-Garcia 2000

(Michael, Department Head and Associate Professor of Ethnic Studies Education, “How to Tell a Mestizo from an Enchirito: Colonialism and National Culture in the Borderlands,” *Diacritics,* Volume: 30(4), p. 110-111)

At times, Anzaldúa is clearly in line with theorists like the Cuban linguist and philosopher Roberto Fernández Retamar, who argues that Latin Americans should choose cultural identification with the most oppressed sectors of their societies [Fernández Retamar 27]. At other times, however, **Anzaldúa’s argument loses the specificity it needs, and there is little to distinguish the new mestiza from the Enchirito® of late capitalism**. This happens, for example, when she describes the importance of gay men and lesbians as border crossers: “homosexuals have strong bonds with the queer white, Black, Asian, Native American, Latino, and with the queer in Italy, Australia and the rest of the planet. ... Our role is to link people with each other—the Blacks with Jews with Indians with Asians with whites with extraterrestrials” [*Borderlands* 84–85]. The juggling of cultures, blurring of cultural boundaries, and appropriation of modes of living characteristic of profit-motivated corporate multiculturalism seem at times to resemble the practice of “the new mestiza”: *The new mestiza copes by developing a tolerance for contradictions, a tolerance for ambiguity.* ***She learns to be an Indian in Mexican culture, to be Mexican from an Anglo point of view. She learns to juggle cultures. She has a plural* *personality****, she operates in a pluralistic mode—nothing is thrust out, the good* *the bad and the ugly****, nothing rejected, nothing abandoned****. Not only does she* *sustain contradictions, she turns the ambivalence into something else.* [79] **Anzaldúa is developing** **a new epistemology here**, **but one needs to be careful to ask, what makes this new, what makes it different from capitalist contradiction and flux**? Surely **a late capitalist epistemology also needs to sustain contradictions, to be plural, to juggle cultures, and to tolerate ambiguity, and, although it does not ground itself in the resistance of the oppressed, it has proved remarkably successful in adapting that resistance to its own purposes**. Anzaldúa has acknowledged this aspect of capitalist culture in the Keating interview, characterizing it, similarly to Amin, as a homogenizing unity [Keating 110]. I will return to her response to this capitalist homogenization in the next section. First, I want to engage seriously with objections that some have raised to the ways *Borderlands* figures the new mestiza epistemology

#### Further, their methodology is antithetical to material praxis. The reduction of the world’s meaning to symbols and language and their fear of approaching statist politics denies revolutionary potential. Only by embracing politics and institutions are we able to transform the political arena

**Ebert in 95**, (Teresa L., English, State University of New York, Albany, Rethinking Marxism Association for Economic and Social Analysis, vol 8 no 2, The Knowable Good--Post-al Ethics,
the Question of Justice and Red Feminism, index found here, <http://www.ritsumei.ac.jp/acd/gr/gsce/d/rm.htm#95>, article here, <http://www.geocities.com/redtheory/AO/AOVol5-1RedFeminism.html> )

What is of primary concern in anarchic-ludic politics is not so much "human emancipation" from economic exploitation but that, as Aronowitz says, "human emancipation, if that term may be employed at all in the post-communist era, may be antagonistic to highly centralized authority and power" (1994, 44). In other words, in post-al politics, the issue of human emancipation is largely displaced and put in question--becoming more a matter of skepticism. If it is addressed at all, it is largely reduced to a problem of individual "freedom," an "antagonism" to "centralized authority and power" (1994, 44), without even asking how that centralized authority is related to the ownership of the means of production. This in turn becomes one of the main alibis for dismissing socialism because of its "authoritarian political legacy." But this simplistic ludic opposition of emancipation and authority completely rejects the revolutionary necessity of appropriating the power and authority of the state (the executive committee of the owners of the means of production) for social transformation. It so focuses on the (bourgeois) priority of individual freedom from any constraints on desires and differences, that it denies the revolutionary necessity of appropriating power to end the ways in which the individual desires and differences of the few are used to exploit the many. Let us not forget the revolutionary uses of state authority, for example, in the People's Republic of China, to (until recently) successfully eliminate the most severe socio-economic exploitation of women--including female infanticide, indenture, sexual slavery and prostitution--and provide women with extensive health care, education and economic opportunities. However, the recent counter-revolution in China and (re)turn to market economy has meant less state authority exercised on these issues in order to promote the emergence of privatization and "free" enterprise. This is creating a severe deterioration in the condition of women in all areas: much higher unemployment for women; a debilitating decline in health care for women, and the revival of female infanticide, indenture, sexual harassment and abuse on the job. Ludic feminism and the post-al left entirely occlude the historical necessity of the class struggle over power--that is, the revolutionary struggle to wrest power away from the owners of the means of production and end the exploitative divisions of labor around gender, sexuality, race, nationality. In the anarchic-ludic logic such struggle is a non-issue, since power, is seen as nondeterminate and immanently generating its own local sites of resistance. Liberation is seen as freedom from authority, from regulation, from any constraints on the free play of the possibilities of (sexual) differences. It is reduced to a cultural politics confined to superstructural practices and severed from the material relations of production. Such a post-al freedom (post-authority, post-state, post-class, post-production) is disturbingly close to the demands (desires) of the "new" aggressive entrepreneurial anarchism of late capitalism that is so evident in the backlash against health care reform and affirmative action in the U.S. and the increasing strength of right-wing politics and racism both in the U.S. and in Europe. This entrepreneurial anarchism is passionately, even violently, committed to a completely unfettered freedom for the individual to pursue profit unconstrained by the state and any obligation to the social good. Ludic feminists, obviously, do not necessarily sanction such entrepreneurial objectivities. Cornell's "ethical feminism," for instance, seeks to theorize an ethical "Good," but she understands this "Good," as "the equitable honoring of faces," by which she means a reciprocal recognition of the other. In other words, Cornell's understanding of the "Good," of justice, as I have already demonstrated, is a matter of (non)representation isolated from the relations of production. Cornell's ethics, like the post-al politics of other ludic feminists, is quite unable to challenge the effects of entrepreneurial anarchism. Instead, the effects of ludic claims for the unrestricted play of (sexual) differences, for the unrestricted freedom of individual desires, reinforce this aggressive individualism. There is very little difference--in their effects--between ethical feminists and free market entrepreneurs in late capitalism. For all its complicity with entrepreneurial anarchism, ludic theory is haunted by Marx and historical materialism--a "haunting obsession" that, as Derrida points out in his text Specters of Marx, is "the dominant influence on discourse today" (1994, 37). Ludic theory, including much feminist theory, has expended enormous energy and effort to displace, discredit and dismiss Marx and Marxism.4 But we see the undeniable necessity of Marxism precisely in the ludic efforts to deny it. This contradiction is especially evident in Butler's text, "Poststructuralism and Postmarxism," which is yet another effort to suppress historical materialism and with it a revolutionary understanding of emancipation. Written as a review of Drucilla Cornell's The Philosophy of the Limit and of an essay by Ernesto Laclau, called "Beyond Emancipation," Butler's text is an argument in favor of an un-principled, pragmatic, post-al politics of "politically practicable possibilities" following what she finds to be the "impossibility" of Marxism and the "unrealizability of the Good and/or Emancipation" (1993b, 10-11). While Butler marks a difference between her own more Nietzschean-Foucauldian approach and the more "Derridean approach" of Cornell and Laclau, her discussion of these texts is largely approbatory and quite exemplary of the ludic logic and its post-al politics. As Butler sums up these related positions: For Cornell, the unrealizability of the Good, as she calls it, is the very condition of the possibility for the ethical relation; for Laclau, the unrealizability of `emancipation' is the condition of the possibility for a political field mobilized and expanded through antagonism; and for me, the loss of the subject as center and ground of meaning has been, still is, the condition of the possibility of a discursive modality of agency. (1993b, 8) This "valorization" of "unrealizability" derives in large part from the Lyotardian "incredulity" toward narratives or metanarratives--especially what Butler refers to as "the apparent failure of Marxist teleologies" (1993b, 3). According to Butler, "Marxist versions of history" have lost "credibility" not because "this version of history has played itself out, has taken place, and is now over" but rather because "belief in the possibility of such a history ever taking place, regardless of its temporal placement in past, present, or future, is now in permanent crisis" (1993b, 3). What is this "Marxist version of history" Butler considers implausible? It is the historical materialist understanding of the forces of history as "the history of class struggles" (Marx 1988, 55). It is important to remind ourselves that this is an understanding of history not as narrative, not as contingencies, not as the desires of individuals, but rather, as Marx writes, history is the process in which "the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production," which have turned "from forms of development of the productive forces... into their fetters" (1970, 21) This then, according to Marx, "begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure." For, it is in the "ideological forms" of the superstructure that "men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out" (1970, 21). The historical materialist explanation of history, in short, is a theory of social struggle and change--what Cornell dismisses as "messianic" history and Laclau as "eschatological" history (Butler, 1993b, 3). But historical materialism is not messianic, nor idealist, utopian belief, rather it is a concrete praxis: it is a critique of the existing relations of production and exploitation in order not just to interpret the world (the goal of ludic theorists), as Marx says in his famous "Thesis XI," but to "change it" (1976, 5). Laclau's attack on Marxism as "eschatological" is an alibi for positing history as aleatory: as the effect of haphazard forces of the market. If "eschatology" is the real question here, then it is "radical democracy" that is the outcome of an eschatological historiography.

#### We have an ethical obligation to reject global capitalism because of the suffering it imposes upon millions across the globe and because of the way it circumscribes the very field of political possibilities.

Slavoj **Zizek and** Glyn Daly, Senior Lecturer in Politics in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at University College, Northampton, 2004, Conversations With Zizek, p. 14-16

For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gord­ian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the constitutive violence of today’s global capitalism and its obscene naturalization/anonymization of the millions who are subju­gated by it throughout the world. Against the standardized positions of postmodern culture — with all its pieties con­cerning ‘multiculturalist’ etiquette — Zizek is arguing for a politics that might be called ‘radically incorrect’ in the sense that it breaks with these types of positions and focuses instead on the very organizing principles of today’s social reality: the principles of global liberal capitalism. This requires some care and subtlety. For far too long, Marxism has been bedevilled by an almost fetishistic economism that has tended towards political mor­bidity. With the likes of Hilferding and Gramsci, and more recently Laclau and Mouffe, crucial theoretical advances have been made that enable the transcendence of all forms of economism. In this new context, however, Zizek argues that the problem that now presents itself is almost that of the opposite fetish. That is to say, the prohibitive anxieties surrounding the taboo of economism can function as a way of not engaging with economic reality and as a way of im­plicitly accepting the latter as a basic horizon of existence. In an ironic Freudian-Lacanian twist, the fear of economism can end up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary capitalism (i.e. the initial prohibi­tion conjures up the very thing it fears). This is not to endorse any kind of retrograde return to economism. Zizek’s point is rather that in rejecting economism we should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the lives and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular we should not overlook Marx’s central insight that in order to create a uni­versal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politico-discursive violence of its construction through a kind of gentrification of that system. What is persistently denied by neo-liberals such as Rorty (1989) and Fukuyama (1992) is that the gentrification of global liberal capitalism is one whose ‘universalism’ fundamentally reproduces and depends upon a disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world’s population. In this way, neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize capitalism by presenting its out­comes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgement in a neutral marketplace. Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diver­sity, at least for the central capitalist regions, but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say, the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded ‘life-chances’ cannot be calculated within the existing economic rationale and, in consequence, social exclusion remains mystified and name­less (viz, the patronizing reference to the ‘developing world’. And Zizek’s point is that this mystification is mag­nified through capitalism’s profound capacity to ingest its own excesses and negativity: to redirect (or misdirect) social antagonisms and to absorb them within a culture of differ­ential affirmation. Instead of Bolshevism, the tendency today is towards a kind of political boutiquism that is readily sus­tained by postmodern forms of consumerism and lifestyle. Against this Zizek argues for a new universalism whose primary ethical directive is to confront the fact that our forms of social existence are founded on exclusion on a global scale. While it is perfectly true that universalism can never become Universal (it will always require a hegemonic-par­ticular embodiment in order to have any meaning), what is novel about Zizek’s universalism is that it would not attempt to conceal this fact or to reduce the status of the abject Other to that of a ‘glitch’ in an otherwise sound matrix.

#### The alternative is to embrace a Marxist methodology by rejecting the affirmative’s ideological mystification of capitalism’s material base. Only by rejecting this ideology can we lay bare the structural causes of oppression and spark the revolutionary praxis necessary to build a classless society.

Stephen Tumino, prof. of English at Pitt, Spring 2001, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More Than Ever Before,” The Red Critique 1, Spring, <http://www.redcritique.org/spring2001/whatisorthodoxmarxism.htm>

The "original" ideas of Marxism are inseparable from their effect as "demystification" of ideology—for example the deployment of "class" that allows a demystification of daily life from the haze of consumption. Class is thus an "original idea" of Marxism in the sense that it cuts through the hype of cultural agency under capitalism and reveals how culture and consumption are tied to labor, the everyday determined by the workday: how the amount of time workers spend engaging in surplus-labor determines the amount of time they get for reproducing and cultivating their needs. Without changing this division of labor social change is impossible. Orthodoxy is a rejection of the ideological annotations: hence, on the one hand, the resistance to orthodoxy as "rigid" and "dogmatic" "determinism," and, on the other, its hybridization by the flexodox as the result of which it has become almost impossible today to read the original ideas of Marxism, such as "exploitation"; "surplus-value"; "class"; "class antagonism"; "class struggle"; "revolution"; "science" (i.e., objective knowledge); "ideology" (as "false consciousness"). Yet, it is these ideas alone that clarify the elemental truths through which theory ceases to be a gray activism of tropes, desire and affect, and becomes, instead, a red, revolutionary guide to praxis for a new society freed from exploitation and injustice. Marx's original scientific discovery was his labor theory of value. Marx's labor theory of value is an elemental truth of Orthodox Marxism that is rejected by the flexodox left as the central dogmatism of a "totalitarian" Marxism. It is only Marx's labor theory of value, however, that exposes the mystification of the wages system that disguises exploitation as a "fair exchange" between capital and labor and reveals the truth about this relation as one of exploitation. Only Orthodox Marxism explains how what the workers sell to the capitalist is not labor, a commodity like any other whose price is determined by fluctuations in supply and demand, but their labor-power—their ability to labor in a system which has systematically "freed" them from the means of production so they are forced to work or starve—whose value is determined by the amount of time socially necessary to reproduce it daily. The value of labor-power is equivalent to the value of wages workers consume daily in the form of commodities that keep them alive to be exploited tomorrow. Given the technical composition of production today this amount of time is a slight fraction of the workday the majority of which workers spend producing surplus-value over and above their needs. The surplus-value is what is pocketed by the capitalists in the form of profit when the commodities are sold. Class is the antagonistic division thus established between the exploited and their exploiters. Without Marx's labor theory of value one could only contest the after effects of this outright theft of social labor-power rather than its cause lying in the private ownership of production. The flexodox rejection of the labor theory of value as the "dogmatic" core of a totalitarian Marxism therefore is a not so subtle rejection of the principled defense of the (scientific) knowledge workers need for their emancipation from exploitation because only the labor theory of value exposes the opportunism of knowledges (ideology) that occult this exploitation. Without the labor theory of value socialism would only be a moral dogma that appeals to the sentiments of "fairness" and "equality" for a "just" distribution of the social wealth that does the work of capital by naturalizing the exploitation of labor under capitalism giving it an acceptable "human face." It is only Orthodox Marxism that explains socialism as an historical inevitability that is tied to the development of social production itself and its requirements. Orthodox Marxism makes socialism scientific because it explains how in the capitalist system, based on the private consumption of labor-power (competition), the objective tendency is to reduce the amount of time labor spends in reproducing itself (necessary labor) while expanding the amount of time labor is engaged in producing surplus-value (surplus-labor) for the capitalist through the introduction of machinery into the production process by the capitalists themselves to lower their own labor costs. Because of the competitive drive for profits under capitalism it is historically inevitable that a point is reached when the technical mastery—the amount of time socially necessary on average to meet the needs of society through the processing of natural resources—is such that the conditions of the workers worsen relative to the owners and becomes an unbearable global social contradiction in the midst of the ever greater of wealth produced. It is therefore just as inevitable that at such a moment it obviously makes more sense to socialize production and meet the needs of all to avoid the explosive social conflicts perpetually generated by private property than to maintain the system at the risk of total social collapse on a world scale. "Socialism or barbarism" (Luxemburg) is the inevitable choice faced by humanity because of capitalism. Either maintain private property and the exploitation of labor in production, in which case more and more social resources will go into policing the growingly desperate surplus-population generated by the technical efficiency of social production, or socialize production and inaugurate a society whose founding principle is "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs" (Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program, Selected Works, 325) and "in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all" (Manifesto of the Communist Party, Selected Works, 53). The time has come to state it clearly so that even the flexodox opportunists may grasp it: Orthodox Marxism is not a free-floating "language-game" or "meta-narrative" for arbitrarily constructing local utopian communities or spectral activist inversions of ideology meant to seduce "desire" and "mobilize" (glorify) subjectivity—it is an absolute prerequisite for our emancipation from exploitation and a new society freed from necessity! Orthodox Marxism is the only global theory of social change. Only Orthodox Marxism has explained why under the system of wage-labor and capital communism is not "an ideal to which reality will have to adjust itself" but "the real movement which abolishes the present state of things" (The German Ideology 57) because of its objective explanation of and ceaseless commitment to "the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interest of the immense majority" (Manifesto of the Communist Party, Selected Works, 45) to end social inequality forever.

### Case

#### Their Anzaldua evidence engages in a number of ableist metaphors- mobility, paralysis, etc.

Ferri and May 5 (Beth and Vivian, “Fixated on Ability: Questioning Ableist Metaphors in Feminist Theories of Resistance”, Prose Studies, 27 (1&2),)

However, feminist theorists do not only use analogies to disability to identify various unacknowledged forms of privilege and power. Many critical race-gender theorists also invoke disability to highlight the negative and destructive effects of oppression, to characterize how oppression can be internalized, and to urge others to reject given social hierarchies. For example, emphasizing the costs of a colonized imagination, Nada Hlia explains, "Living at one remove from oneself is indeed a handicap" (230). Others link the destructive results of internalized racism to a "stumbling mind" (Cervantes 5) or to being "muted" and "paralyzed" (Lugones 49, 53). Gloria Anzaldua asserts that internalized racism "mutilates and stunts vour life" because your personhood is "chopped off at the knees" *(Haciendo euros* xix; *En rapport* 207). In her later work, Anzaldua continues to use ableist notions of paralysis to characterize a "stuck" consciousness. She writes, "Coyolxauhqui's luz pulls you from the pit of your grief. Realizing that you always use the same tactics, repeat the same behaviors in each stage, breaks your paralysis" *(Now* 253 54). The thread of connection across these examples is of course the slippage between disability and ignorance or the assumption that to be crippled is to be unable to move or act. In all of these examples in which oppression is linked to illness and dis/ease, *the analogies position the source of disability oppression as impairment itself*.Once again, there is little to no understanding of disability as resulting from social structures and objectifying knowledge practices that create disabilities out of corporeal differences. In other words, although racism and sexism are seen as socially produced, disability remains as an absolute state, both apolitical and asocial it is the source of its own oppression.

#### Their metaphors of border crossing as a form of resistance reinstate norms of able-bodiedness as connoting freedom and the ability to engage in resistance.

Ferri and May 5 (Beth and Vivian, “Fixated on Ability: Questioning Ableist Metaphors in Feminist Theories of Resistance”, Prose Studies, 27 (1&2),)

In addition to the use of explicitly ableist metaphors, it is equally important to think about how ableism plays out in more implicit ways. In this vein, we wonder about many of the metaphors of movement being used in contemporary discourse. Consider this query posed to incite innovative action toward a more positive future: "What... if we were to tap into the lifeforce that confers upon us the right to live and work toward possibility as opposed to remaining paralyzed and dissatisfied.. *.V* (Cervenak et al. 354). A life of possibility, and even the lifeforce itself, is constructed here in opposition to "paralysis" and dissatisfaction: in other words, being moved to act and live in fulfilling ways requires a form of *movement* that is understood in ableist terms. Iliis example is not unique, however. References to roving subjects, boundary crossers, and migrating subjects abound: is the movement invoked to signal freedom conceptualized in ways that account for or include disability? Our suspicion is that it is not. Are contemporary theorists imagining rolling down the road to freedom or is there an assumption of marching as the authoritative sign of collective group action? What notions of motility are at use in the idea of crossing borders, leaving home, or exile? What of the ideas of unrestrained movement at work in the many references to untethered subjectivities or "figures of hybridity and excess jsuch as the cvborgj" (Thomson, *Inicfitaiinn* 9)? Just as whiteness frequently operates as an unstated/unmarked racial norm (in, for example, analogies between homophobia and racism (Carbado 291)), able-bodiedness continues to operate as the unstated/unnoticed bodily norm both in analogies to disability and in metaphors for freedom and agency. This dynamic obscures the fact that able-bodied people are, in fact, embodied and that disabled persons are disenabled by systems of power. Additionally, it denies the myriad forms of unearned able-bodied privilege accorded to non-disabled persons. \*l\*he able-bodied or "ambulist" (Keith) notions of mobility and movement used to define and imagine liberation, resistance, and transformation require an unstated, but understood, notion of stasis as their figurative, disabled doppelganger. Here, we turn again to our own writing to further illustrate our point. In our discussion of the character Nichole in Atom Kgoyan's film adaption of the novel, *The Sweet Hereafter,* we analyze Nichole's newfound agency, which rests on her astute uses of ableism to refuse sexual exploitation by her father. Yet in our article, we problematically celebrate the scene at the close of the film when she wheels herself away from the deposition table. Ironically, in analyzing the interdependent nature of ableism and sexism, we privileged autonomy and a narrow notion of motility as signifiers of freedom and agency (May and rerri, 145). The *motility* that is imagined, in our example and in many others, as signaling freedom, political action or movement, or agency often (directly or indirectly) constructs disability as a state of being that is dependent, relational, "stuck," broken, and/or in need of a cure in contrast, of course, to the critical or postmodern subject who seems unfettered, on the move, independent, and whole. Such a framework replicates a troubling figure/ground dichotomy and stymies our ability to rethink diverse modes of motility, movement, agency, freedom, and subjectivity.

#### This must be a voting issue – Ableist Speech strengthens oppression and destroys the purposes of public debate – the impacts trump the other warrants in their arguments

Wheelchair Dancer, 2008

(“On Making Argument: Disability and Language”, <http://cripwheels.blogspot.com/2008/04/on-making-argument-disability-and.html> Accessed: 2/10/11)
If you are feeling a little bit of resistance, here, I'd ask you to think about it. If perhaps what I am saying feels like a burden -- too much to take on? a restriction on your carefree speech? -- perhaps that feeling can also serve as an indicator of how pervasive and thus important the issue is. As a community, we've accepted that commonly used words can be slurs, and as a rule, we avoid them, hopefully in the name of principle, but sometimes only in the name of civility. Do you go around using derivatives of the b**\*ch** word?If you do, I bet you check which community you are in**....** Same thing for the N word**.** These days, **depending on your age,** you might say something is retarded **or spastic,** but you probably never say that it's gay. I'd like to suggest that society as a whole has not paid the same kind of attention to disabled people's concerns about language. By not paying attention to the literal value, the very real substantive, physical, psychological, sensory, and emotional experiences that come with these linguistic moves, we have created a negative rhetorical climate. In this world, it is too easy for feminists and people of colour to base their claims on argumentative strategies that depend, as their signature moves, on marginalizing the experience of disabled people and on disparaging their appearance and bodies. Much of the blogosphere discourse of the previous weeks has studied the relationships between race, (white) feminism and feminists, and WOC bloggers. To me, the intellectual takeaway has been an emerging understanding of how, in conversation, notions of appropriation, citation, ironization, and metaphorization can be deployed as strategies of legitimation and exclusion. And, as a result, I question how "oppressed, minoritized" groups differentiate themselves from other groups in order to seek justice and claim authority. Must we always define ourselves in opposition and distance to a minoritized and oppressed group that can be perceived as even more unsavory than the one from which one currently speaks? As I watched the discussion about who among the feminist and WOC bloggers has power and authority and how that is achieved, I began to recognise a new power dynamic both on the internet and in the world at large. Feminism takes on misogyny. The WOC have been engaging feminism. But from my point of view, a wide variety of powerful feminist and anti-racist discourse is predicated on negative disability stereotyping. There's a kind of hierarchy here: the lack of awareness about disability, disability culture and identity, and our civil rights movement has resulted in a kind of domino effect where disability images are the metaphor of last resort: the bottom, the worst. Disability language has about it a kind of untouchable quality -- as if the horror and weakness of a disabled body were the one true, reliable thing, a touchstone to which we can turn when we know we can't use misogynistic or racist language. When we engage in these kinds of argumentative strategies, we exclude a whole population of people whose histories are intricately bound up with ours. When we deploy these kinds of strategies to underscore the value of our own existence in the world, we reaffirm and strengthen the systems of oppression that motivated us to speak out in the first place.

#### The borderlands criticism creates a discursive practice similair to “Orientalism” in the way it displaces the geographic differences of the area into one vast imagined territory.

Vaquera-Vásquez ’98 (Santiago, Texas A&M - Latin American Issues 14(6). [http://webpub.allegheny.edu/group/LAS/LatinAmIssues/Articles/Vol14/LAI\_vol\_14\_section\_VI.html](file:///C%3A%5CUsers%5CAustin%5CBORDERLANDS%5CLAI_vol_14_section_VI.html) -

**Cultural criticism on the Borderlands has created a discursive practice which arises from the meeting of the so-called "First World" with a geographic "Other," the "Third World." This type of project, in which a critical field is marked out through a geographic region, is similar to the practice of "Orientalism"** critically reviewed by Edward Said. However, where Orientalism becomes a colonialist project by the West to control the East-through a discourse which displaces the geographic differences between the East and West into one single vast imagined territory-**Borderlands criticism, and its controlling forces, arises from within the area in question.2 Just as Said reads Orientalist works through the "imagined geographies" that the works construct, so too can the borderlands be subjected to a topographical reading.** The region that is now the southwestern United States, and formerly Spanish and then Mexican territory, comprises the largest body of work in what we can term a "Borderlands project," a project which is a discursive field made up of historical chronicles, linguistic documents, artistic and literary works, and distinct political and social realities. This is an ongoing work that has been under construction since the 16th century Spanish chronicles describing the region. However, **rather than map the history of this area**-such a historical review extends well beyond the purview of this study3 --**the present work presses forward to the twentieth century to note recent formulations of the border** **as the Borderlands.**

#### Viewing the border as metaphor for a hybrid communal zone displaces the borderlands reality through discourse that ignores the Mexican perspective and creates a conception of Mexico as a zone of poverty, lawlessness, and corruption.

Vaquera-Vásquez ’98

(Santiago, Texas A&M - Latin American Issues 14(6). [http://webpub.allegheny.edu/group/LAS/LatinAmIssues/Articles/Vol14/LAI\_vol\_14\_section\_VI.html](file:///C%3A%5CUsers%5CAustin%5CBORDERLANDS%5CLAI_vol_14_section_VI.html)

**While the vision of the border as a metaphor for a hybrid, communal zone may be appealing, it has further advanced the displacement and "invisibilation" of the borderlands reality, and particularly, of northern Mexico. As noted at the outset, and corroborated throughout the present discussion, much of the Chicano cultural discourse has ignored the Mexican perspective**.**6 If there is a conception of Mexico at all, it is as an echo, a cultural tie in the past-such a trace is evident in the works of Anzaldúa and Mora-or as a zone of poverty and lawlessness, as in much of the media portrayals, the political discourse out of Washington D.C. and Mexico City**, and such works as Luis Alberto Urrea's *Across the Wire*, in which the author documents the hardships of Tijuana's lower classes. While the latter work is a powerful testimonial, **exposing the terrible conditions of the poor on the border, it also maintains the stereotypical image of Tijuana--and on a larger scale, the perception of the border region--as a zone of corruption.7 A necessary component of the present Borderlands project. then, is the in-depth study of northern Mexican border perspective.**

# 2NC

## T

### A2 FW = Imperialism

#### Only maintaining procedures of democratic deliberation opens up the process of self reflection and exchange of ideas that fosters true cultural exchange

Anderson 2006

(Amanda, prof of English at Johns Hopkins, The Way We Argue Now, 37-8)

I want to return now to Butler’s attempts to define politics against philosophy (at least the brand of critical theory represented by Benhabib) and her discomfort at seeming to endorse the activity of “philosophical exchange” represented by Feminist Contentions. Butler characterizes Benhabib’s position as the desire to let “philosophy” redeem life, claiming that such a desire reveals an abandonment of politics itself. I have argued that it is not such an abandonment. But I also want to underscore the irony of Butler’s position here, which attempts to set a realm of “pure” politics against any activity that lapses into the project of normative justification. Butler herself argues that we can never avoid laying down foundations and positing universals. She also argues that we must continually subject our use of contingent foundations to rigorous critique, so as to promote not the deconstruction of universality itself, but its greater inclusiveness. The fact that “the scope of rights considered to be universal” is governed by contingent conditions “simply means that the claim to universality hasnot yet received a full or final articulation and that it remains to be seen how and whether it will be articulated further” (FC, 130). Butler here unmistakably projects an ideal of progress toward such a desired telos (even if it is not guaranteed, and is necessarily asymptotic).20 And it is precisely at this point in her argument, when she actually begins to sound like a critical theorist, that she feels compelled to distinguish herself fully from critical theory, producing the passages about normative philosophy as the abandonment of politics.¶ If nothing else, it is clear that a lot is at stake here for Butler. Why does Butler attempt to disqualify in advance (to adopt one of her favorite phrases) any politics that employs the normative principles and procedures of communicative ethics, which are simply attempts to justify and promote practices and institutions that might allow the fullest possible scope to universal rights and public contestation? First, as I argued earlier, Benhabib’s investment in a specific form of socialized autonomy goes entirely against Butler’s ongoing attempts to elaborate a theory of performative agency. Second, the theory of communicative action, as a species of “philosophy,” ironically operates for Butler as a useful foil against which to define a protected conception of political purity. Third, Butler conceives of critical theory as tainted by a form of imperialism, valorizing Western notions of universality at the expense of other cultures’ rights to sovereignty. Not accidentally, her passage on increasing the scope of universal rights is separated from her condemnation of normative philosophy by a short paragraph on the problems of “translation” in an international arena. Likewise, “Contingent Foundations” argues strenuously for the furtherance of “democratic contestation within a postcolonial horizon” (FC, 41).¶ But once again, Butler seems to mischaracterize Benhabib’s critical theory in order to secure the pedigree of her own politics. To begin with, Benhabib’s “interactive universalism” is not incompatible with Butler’s calls for intercultural dialogue here. In addition, Benhabib writes in Situating the Self that it is precisely the horizon of modernity generally that has seen not simply a unidirectional and efficient imperialism, but also complex exchange and self-reflective dialogue between cultures: the West has not monolithically maintained hegemony but has itself been continually transformed by conflictual and cooperative exchanges with other cultures. Benhabib wants to extend processes of intercultural exchange and understanding, precisely by means of the regulative ideals of dialogue and democracy (SS, 61–63n48). That may leave her open to the charge of valorizing Western democracy, but surely Butler is left open to the same 38¶ same charge when she champions universal rights and refuses a concept of radical incommensurability between cultures (FC, 131).¶

### T Version Solves

#### Topical version of the aff solves

Orly Lobel, University of San Diego Assistant Professor of Law, 2007, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics,” 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/lobel.pdf

V. RESTORING CRITICAL OPTIMISM IN THE LEGAL FIELD

“La critique est aisée; l’art difficile.”

A critique of cooptation often takes an uneasy path. Critique has always been and remains not simply an intellectual exercise but a political and moral act. The question we must constantly pose is how critical accounts of social reform models contribute to our ability to produce scholarship and action that will be constructive. To critique the ability of law to produce social change is inevitably to raise the question of alternatives. In and of itself, the exploration of the limits of law and the search for new possibilities is an insightful field of inquiry. However, the contemporary message that emerges from critical legal consciousness analysis has often resulted in the distortion of the critical arguments themselves. This distortion denies the potential of legal change in order to illuminate what has yet to be achieved or even imagined. Most importantly, cooptation analysis is not unique to legal reform but can be extended to any process of social action and engagement. When claims of legal cooptation are compared to possible alternative forms of activism, the false necessity embedded in the contemporary story emerges — a story that privileges informal extralegal forms as transformative while assuming that a conservative tilt exists in formal legal paths. In the triangular conundrum of “law and social change,” law is regularly the first to be questioned, deconstructed, and then critically dismissed. The other two components of the equation — social and change — are often presumed to be immutable and unambiguous. Understanding the limits of legal change reveals the dangers of absolute reliance on one system and the need, in any effort for social reform, to contextualize the discourse, to avoid evasive, open-ended slogans, and to develop greater sensitivity to indirect effects and multiple courses of action. Despite its weaknesses, however, law is an optimistic discipline. It operates both in the present and in the future. Order without law is often the privilege of the strong. Marginalized groups have used legal reform precisely because they lacked power. Despite limitations, these groups have often successfully secured their interests through legislative and judicial victories. Rather than experiencing a ~~disabling~~ disenchantment with the legal system, we can learn from both the successes and failures of past models, with the aim of constantly redefining the boundaries of legal reform and making visible law’s broad reach.

### A2 Banking

#### Our advocacy skills are critical to civic participation, reinvigorating the public sphere and challenging dogmatism. Their framework cedes political engagement to elitists, turning case.

Giroux 2006

[Henry A., Global TV Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, formerly Boston University, Miami University, Penn State University, *America on the Edge*, pg. 232-235]

As those public spaces disappear that once offered forums for debating norms, critically engaging ideas, making private issues public, and evaluating judgments, it becomes critical for educators to raise fundamental questions about what it means to revitalize public life, politics, and ethics in ways that take seriously such values as patriotism, “citizen participation . . . political obligation, social governance, and community.”“ Educators are confronted with the problem as well as the challenge of analyzing, engaging, and developing those public spheres that help create citizens who are equipped to exercise their freedoms, competent to question the basic assumptions that govern political life, and skilled enough to participate in shaping the social, political, and economic orders that govern their lives. Two factors, however, work against such developments. First, there are very few public spheres left that provide the space for such conversations to take place. For instance, high school gyms are increasingly used by companies, while many privately owned coffee shops don't allow UDLs to meet. Second, it is increasingly difficult for young people and adults to translate private problems into public concerns or to relate public issues to private considerations. For many young people and adults today, the private sphere has become the only space in which to imagine any sense of hope, pleasure, or possibility. Reduced to the act of consuming, citizenship is “mostly about forgetting, not learning.”5 The decline of democratic values and informed citizenship can be seen in research studies done by The justice Project in 2001 in which a substantial number of teenagers and young people were asked what they thought democracy meant. The answers testified to a growing depoliticization of American life and largely consisted of statements along the following lines: “Nothing,” “I don’t know,” or “My rights, just like, pride, I guess, to some extent, and paying taxes,” or “I just think, like, what does it really mean? I know it’s out, like, our government, but I don’t know what it technically is.”(‘ The transition from being ignorant about democracy to actually sup- porting antidemocratic tendencies can be seen in a number of youth surveys that have been taken since 2000. For instance, a survey released by the University of California, Berkeley, revealed that 69 percent of students support school prayer and 44 percent of young people aged fifteen to twenty-two support government restrictions on abortions. A 2004 survey of 1 12,003 high school students on First Amendment rights showed that one third of students surveyed believed that the First Amendment went too far in the rights it guarantees and 36 percent believed that the press enjoyed too much freedom.7 This suggests not just a failing of education, but a crisis of citizenship and democracy. One consequence of the decline in democratic values and citizenship literacy is that all levels of government are being hollowed out, their role reduced to dismantling the gains of the welfare state as they increasingly construct policies that criminalize social problems and prioritize penal methods over social investments. When citizenship is reduced to consumerism, it should come as no surprise that people develop an indifference to civic engagement and participation in democratic public life. Unlike some theorists who suggest that politics as critical exchange and social engagement is either dead or in a state of terminal arrest, I believe that the current depressing state of politics points to an urgent challenge: reformulating the crisis of democracy as a fundamental crisis of vision, meaning, education, and political agency. Central to my argument is the assumption that politics is not simply about power, but also, as Cornelius Castoriadis points out, “has to do with political judgments and value choices,” meaning that questions of civic education-learning how to become a skilled citizen-are central to democracy itself.“ Educators at all levels need to challenge the assumption that politics is dead, or the nature of politics will be determined exclusively by government leaders and experts in the heat of moral frenzy. Educators need to take a more critical position, arguing that knowledge, debate, and dialogue about pressing social problems offer individuals and groups some hope in shaping the conditions that bear down on their lives. Public civic engagement is essential if the concepts of social life and the public sphere are to be used to revitalize the language of civic education and democratization as part of a broader discourse of political agency and critical citizenship in a global world. Linking the social to democratic public values represents an attempt, however incomplete, to link democracy to public action, as part of a comprehensive attempt to revitalize civic activism and citizen access to decision-making while simultaneously addressing basic problems of social justice and global democracy.

### A2 America Bad

#### 1. this is not a reason role playing is bad—even if the united states does evil things, we should still learn how the system works so we can oppose it

#### 2. Even if the American government is bad, role playing doesn’t associate us with it—we can examine courses of action without endorsing the agent, the same way that historians do when they write counterfactuals about Germany in world war two or actors do when they play a part

#### Switch side debate solves any risk of debate being unethical – their arguments are based in a lack of understanding of the activity and how it works to shape students.

Abbott 2009

(Blake, Debate Coach at the University of Georgia and B.A. in Political Science at Mercer University and M.A. from Wake Forest University, “The Project and Switch Side Debate”, November 11th, http://www.georgiadebate.org/2009/11/the-project-and-switch-side-debate)

In debates that take place between policy teams and project teams, one central sticking point tends to be over the merits of switch side debate in our activity. Proponents of switch side debate argue that doing so offers debaters an opportunity to take a new perspective by learning and advocating a position they might not agree with within a given debate round. Doing so enhances critical thinking skills and teaches debaters to become better advocates for the things they do believe because they have examined all sides of the argument. Opponents argue that switch side debate is basically modern day sophistry, leading to an “anything goes” approach to argumentation that has no ethical foundation. Lack of such foundation leads to rounds where debaters advocate nuclear wars, extinction, and even racism or genocide. I think the major drawback in debates on this particular issue is that they tend to lack real clash. One side says switch side debating is educational, and the other says it’s unethical. No one resolves these two impacts. Well, I will attempt to provide some (contingent, I’m sure) way to resolve this discussion, and I’ll start out by stating my advocacy: project teams should be more willing to engage in switch side debate. In my previous post, I argued that project teams should engage the current debate topic, and I still think avoiding the topic is a big missed opportunity. Here, though, project teams take a very one-size-fits-all approach to switch side debate that misses the chances to explore numerous aspects of their own arguments and strategic goals. I am convinced that the topic presents less of a hindrance and more of an opportunity for project teams to find links to the things they want to say. I’ve heard some arguments/questions that I have heard some project teams make, and I’ve been frankly shocked at how poor the answers to these questions has been. I’ll address a couple here. The first one is a subset of the “switch side debate is unethical” argument, and it goes something like this: “Are you saying that on a slavery topic, we would have to advocate slavery good?” First, I take issue with the question. Switch side debating isn’t just taking both sides of any good/bad debate. There’s more to it than that, especially since sometimes there are more than 2 sides to an issue. Second, this is an extreme example, but even if I grant the premise of the question, I would say that you should be willing to examine that argument and advocate it in the space of a debate. That doesn’t mean that you take on that belief; it does mean that you don’t close off an argument just because you don’t agree. The debate round should be a space to test out arguments, and part of the education one gets from that testing is the experience of advocating something unfamiliar, and even oppositional to your beliefs. Plus, you can better argue against the offending argument if you have tried it on in an environment that encourages you to learn how it works. Ultimately, I dispute the slippery slope in the premise of this argument, though. Maybe you wouldn’t, as a matter of conscience, be willing to go as far as say “slavery good,” but on this year’s topic, you should be willing to argue that either we should reduce our nuclear weapons or we shouldn’t. You can support your claim with reasons based in your project, but the fact that the potential exists advocate bad things in a debate round isn’t by itself a sufficient reason to refuse switch side debate. I'm sure many people arguments they may not be willing to make for their own reasons, but that fact alone is not a condemnation of switch side debating. Another argument I hear is the use of a paragraph from William Spanos in the book “Cross-X” in which he argues that debate’s potential for “‘disinterested’ argumentative skills” becomes a training ground for neoconservative ideology. It is important to note that Spanos’ understanding of debate is marginal at best, but more importantly, even if he’s right that debate can produce neocons, that’s not the only outcome. It can, and has, also produced strong advocates for anti-neocon causes. For example, Neal Katyal, the attorney who successfully argued Hamdan v. Rumsfeld in the Supreme Court, was a debater. Also, I would quibble with the terminology of “disinterested” argumentation that Spanos uses and project teams pick up on. Just because I argue for something institutional in nature in a debate round doesn’t mean that I’m taking a disinterested view. In fact, the process of arguing unfamiliar points is a really good way for me to become interested and gain a personal connection to the arguments that I make in rounds, even if that personal connection isn’t the same as ones that project teams discuss. Believe me, I could just as easily go off on policy teams for not really switching sides on many big arguments (with the exception of the occasional impact turn debate, we pretty much presume that hegemony is good and nuclear war is bad, regardless of side). My basic point here is that project teams do themselves a disservice by closing off new ways to approach argumentation that are allowed by switch side debate. We don’t have to take a full-tilt, anything goes approach, but don’t throw it all out either. Even if some potential for abuse exists, it’s a risk worth taking.

## Case

### A2 Limits = Borders

#### Their border analogy is ridiculous – not only are all borders different, but their silly comparison to T devalues the experiences of migrants

**Vila**, Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Texas at San Antonio, 20**05** [Pablo, “Conclusion: The Limits of American Border Theory,” Ethnography at the Border, Ed. Pablo Vila, p.307-315]

After dominating the field for some time, this corpus of work has come under criticism in recent years. This criticism does not deny the pathbreaking character of those books but seeks to address several short- comings that have now become apparent. As Heyman points out, "A single-image representing grand theoretical assertions is too general for the political and economic environment of the border. I propose that we specify our analytical tools for the border: that is, that we respect the concretely located nature of the Mexico-U.S. border" (1994, 43). Thus several authors have lately advanced different criticisms of mainstream border theory. First, some Mexican scholars (Tabuenca, Barrera) have complained that the U.S.-Mexico border most of this work portrays with such theo- retical sophistication has little resemblance to the border they experience from the other side of the (literal) fence. Second, other writers have noted the exclusionary character of border studies and theory exemplified in these major works and claim that current mainstream border theory essentializes the cultures that must be crossed. Third, as I claim hereafter, in the vast majority of recent border scholarship, there is a general failure to pursue the theoretical possibility that fragmentation of experience can lead to the reinforcement of borders instead of an invitation to cross them. Thus crossing borders, and not reinforcing borders, is the preferred metaphor in current border studies and theory. Fourth, a corollary of the previous trend is the tendency to construct the border crosser or the hybrid (in some cases the Latin American inter- national immigrant in general, but in others the Chicano in particular— at least in the books I am criticizing here) into a new "privileged subject of history." Fifth, border studies have recently moved from the study of is- sues related to the U.S.-Mexico border in particular to broader themes, in which the metaphor of borders is used to represent any situation where limits are involved. Border studies thus takes as its own object of inquiry any physical or psychic space about which it is possible to address problems of boundaries: borders among different countries, borders among ethnicities within the United States, borders between genders, borders among disciplines, and the like. Borderlands and border crossings seem to have become ubiquitous terms to represent the experience of (some) people in a postmodern world described as fragmented and continually producing new borders that must again and again be crossed. And if current border studies and theory propose that borders are everywhere, the border-crossing experience is in some instances assumed to be similar: that is, it seems that for the "border crosser" or the "hybrid," the experience of moving among different disciplines, different ethnicities, and different countries and cultures is not dissimilar in character (Grossberg 1996). This approach not only homogenizes distinctive experiences but also homogenizes borders.' Sixth, there is a tendency in current border studies and theory to confiise the sharing of a culture with the sharing of an identity, so that use of the "third country" metaphor promotes the idea that Fronterizo Mexicans and Mexican Americans construct their social and cultural identities in similar ways. My criticism here is that it is quite possible to share aspects of the same culture while developing quite different narrative identities, to the point, in some instances, where the "other kind of Mexican" is constructed as the abject "other." Finally, in some extreme circumstances and in particular locales, these theoretical processes have developed a version of identity politics on the U.S.-Mcxico border that rely on the metaphor of "brotherhood"-— meaning the purportedly intrinsic connections between Mexican na- tionals, Mexican immigrants, and Chicanos. Yet because that brotherhood does not exist in particular border situations (as exemplified, for instance, in Mexican American support for Operation Blockade in the region dealt with in this collection), this form of identity politics is doomed to failure.

#### Border analogies lead to poor analysis about oppressive structures – turns the case

**Ang**, Professor of Cultural Studies at the University of Western Sydney, Nepean, 19**98** [Ien, “Doing cultural studies at the crossroads,” European Journal of Cultural Studies 1(1), p. 27-28]

As I have already suggested, an explicitly comparative perspective is called for here, as the strategy of comparison implies an awareness of difference as its episte- mological stimulus while at the same time, in its very requirement of juxtaposing at least two realities, being a guard against exaggerated notions of uniqueness and incommensurability. Thus, we should expect as much as we can, say, from a dialogue between Gloria Anzaldua and Iain Chambers; and put as much effort as we can in the substantiation and specification of the metaphors and concepts we use to establish our common grounds. This is not altogether different from the ideal of cosmopolitalism, embraced by Bruce Robbins not, in his words, 4as a false universal1 but \*as an impulse to knowledge that is shared with others, a striving to transcend partiality that is itself partial, but no more so than the similar cognitive strivings of many diverse peoples' (ibid.: 194). This, of course, returns us straight to the borderlands, the arena where the sharing of partial perspectives and knowledges are supposed to take place, in what Robbins (ibid.: 196) calls 'a long-term process of translocal connecting". What I have tried to emphasize in this chapter, however, is the practical fact that there are limits to the sharing we can do, that there is only so much (or so little) that we can share. Indeed, I think we could only stand to gain from the recognition that any process of 'translocal connecting' not only needs hard work, but, more importantly, can only be partial also. I would even suggest that our crossroads encounters would be more productive if we recognize the moments of actual disconnection rather than hold on to the abstract Utopian ideal of connection so bound up with celebrations of the borderlands. For it is in the realization and problematization of such moments of actual disconnection - that is, moments when the act of meaningful comparison and communication reaches its limits - that the material consequences of difference, of the irreducible and unrepresentable specificity and particularity of 'the local' are most bluntly exposed, but always-already within the translocal context within which that 'local' is distinctively constituted. In short, it is at moments when comprehending my local-specific narrative becomes problematic to you, my reader, when such comprehension seems muted because I do not seem to speak in familiar discourse, that the malleability of general theoretical concepts such as 'race', 'nation' and 'identity', not to mention metaphors such as the 'borderlands' and the 'crossroads', becomes evident. It is the ways in which we both do and do not share these (and many other) concepts and metaphors across local/particular/spccific boundaries that we should begin to interrogate and highlight.

### wounded attachments

#### The aff’s narrative is grounded in injuries of the past with no guide for the future---this reinscribes exclusion and foreclosures social justice

Bhambra 10—U Warwick—AND—Victoria Margree—School of Humanities, U Brighton (Identity Politics and the Need for a ‘Tomorrow’, http://www.academia.edu/471824/Identity\_Politics\_and\_the\_Need\_for\_a\_Tomorrow\_)

2 The Reification of Identity We wish to turn now to a related problem within identity politicsthat can be best described as the problem of the reiﬁcation of politicised identities. Brown (1995) positions herself within thedebate about identity politics by seeking to elaborate on “the wounded character of politicised identity’s desire” (ibid: 55); thatis, the problem of “wounded attachments” whereby a claim to identity becomes over-invested in its own historical suffering and perpetuates its injury through its refusal to give up its identity claim. Brown’s argument is that where politicised identity is founded upon an experience of exclusion, for example, exclusion itself becomes perversely valorised in the continuance of that identity. In such cases, group activity operates to maintain and reproduce the identity created by injury (exclusion) rather than– and indeed, often in opposition to – resolving the injurious social relations that generated claims around that identity in the ﬁrst place. If things have to have a history in order to have af uture, then the problem becomes that of how history is con-structed in order to make the future. To the extent that, for Brown, identity is associated primarily with (historical) injury, the future for that identity is then already determined by the injury “as both bound to the history that produced it and as a reproach to the present which embodies that history” (ibid 1995: 73). Brown’s sug-gestion that as it is not possible to undo the past, the focus back- wards entraps the identity in reactionary practices, is, we believe,too stark and we will pursue this later in the article. Politicised identity, Brown maintains, “emerges and obtains its unifying coherence through the politicisation of exclusion from an ostensible universal, as a protest against exclusion” (ibid: 65). Its continuing existence requires both a belief in the legitimacy of the universal ideal (for example, ideals of opportunity, and re- ward in proportion to effort) and enduring exclusion from those ideals. Brown draws upon Nietzsche in arguing that such identi-ties, produced in reaction to conditions of disempowerment andinequality, then become invested in their own impotence through practices of, for example, reproach, complaint, and revenge. These are “reactions” in the Nietzschean sense since they are substitutes for actions or can be seen as negative forms of action. Rather than acting to remove the cause(s) of suffering, that suf-fering is instead ameliorated (to some extent) through “the estab-lishment of suffering as the measure of social virtue” (ibid 1995:70), and is compensated for by the vengeful pleasures of recrimi-nation. Such practices, she argues, stand in sharp distinction to –in fact, provide obstacles to – practices that would seek to dispel the conditions of exclusion. Brown casts the dilemma discussed above in terms of a choicebetween past and future, and adapting Nietzsche, exhorts theadoption of a (collective) will that would become the “redeemer of history” (ibid: 72) through its focus on the possibilities of creat-ing different futures. As Brown reads Nietzsche, the one thingthat the will cannot exert its power over is the past, the “it was”.Confronted with its impotence with respect to the events of thepast, the will is threatened with becoming simply an “angry spec-tator” mired in bitter recognition of its own helplessness. The onehope for the will is that it may, instead, achieve a kind of mastery over that past such that, although “what has happened” cannotbe altered, the past can be denied the power of continuing to de-termine the present and future. It is only this focus on the future, Brown continues, and the capacity to make a future in the face of human frailties and injustices that spares us from a rancorous decline into despair. Identity politics structured by ressentiment – that is, by suffering caused by past events – can only break outof the cycle of “slave morality” by remaking the present againstthe terms of the past, a remaking that requires a “forgetting” of that past. An act of liberation, of self-afﬁrmation, this “forgettingof the past” requires an “overcoming” of the past that offers iden-tity in relationship to suffering, in favour of a future in whichidentity is to be deﬁned differently. In arguing thus, Brown’s work becomes aligned with a posi-tion that sees the way forward for emancipatory politics as re-siding in a movement away from a “politics of memory” (Kilby 2002: 203) that is committed to articulating past injustices andsuffering. While we agree that investment in identities prem-ised upon suffering can function as an obstacle to alleviating the causes of that suffering, we believe that Brown’s argument as outlined is problematic. First, following Kilby (2002), we share a concern about any turn to the future that is ﬁgured as a complete abandonment of the past. This is because for those who have suffered oppression and exclusion, the injunction to give up articulating a pain that is still felt may seem cruel and impossible to meet. We would argue instead that the “turn to the future” that theorists such as Brown and Grosz callfor, to revitalise feminism and other emancipatory politics, need not be conceived of as a brute rejection of the past. Indeed, Brown herself recognises the problems involved here, stating that [since] erased histories and historical invisibility are themselves suchintegral elements of the pain inscribed in most subjugated identities[then] the counsel of forgetting, at least in its unreconstructedNietzschean form, seems inappropriate if not cruel (1995: 74). She implies, in fact, that the demand exerted by those in painmay be no more than the demand to exorcise that pain throughrecognition: “all that such pain may long for – more than revenge– is the chance to be heard into a certain release, recognised intoself-overcoming, incited into possibilities for triumphing over, and hence, losing itself” (1995: 74-75). Brown wishes to establish the political importance of remembering “painful” historical events but with a crucial caveat: that the purpose of remembering pain is to enable its release . The challenge then, according to her,is to create a political culture in which this project does not mutate into one of remembering pain for its own sake. Indeed, if Brown feels that this may be “a pass where we ought to part with Nietzsche” (1995: 74), then Freud may be a more suit-able companion. Since his early work with Breuer, Freud’s writ-ings have suggested the (only apparent) paradox that remember-ing is often a condition of forgetting. The hysterical patient, who is doomed to repeat in symptoms and compulsive actions a past she cannot adequately recall, is helped to remember that trau-matic past in order then to move beyond it: she must remember inorder to forget and to forget in order to be able to live in the present. 7 This model seems to us to be particularly helpful for thedilemma articulated by both Brown (1995) and Kilby (2002),insisting as it does that “forgetting” (at least, loosening the holdof the past, in order to enable the future) cannot be achieved without ﬁrst remembering the traumatic past. Indeed, this wouldseem to be similar to the message of Beloved , whose central motif of haunting (is the adult woman, “Beloved”, Sethe’s murderedchild returned in spectral form?) dramatises the tendency of theunanalysed traumatic past to keep on returning, constraining, asit does so, the present to be like the past, and thereby, disallow-ing the possibility of a future different from that past. As Sarah Ahmed argues in her response to Brown, “in order to break the seal of the past, in order to move away from attach-ments that are hurtful, we must ﬁrst bring them into the realm of political action” (2004: 33). We would add that the task of analys-ing the traumatic past, and thus opening up the possibility of political action, is unlikely to be achievable by individuals on their own, but that this, instead, requires a “community” of participants dedicated to the serious epistemic work of rememberingand interpreting the objective social conditions that made up thatpast and continue in the present. The “pain” of historical injury is not simply an individual psychological issue, but stems from objective social conditions which perpetuate, for the most part, forms of injustice and inequality into the present. In sum, Brown presents too stark a choice between past andfuture. In the example of Beloved with which we began thisarticle, Paul D’s acceptance of Sethe’s experiences of slavery asdistinct from his own, enable them both to arrive at new under-standings of their experience. Such understanding is a way of partially “undoing” the (effects of) the past and coming to terms with the locatedness of one’s being in the world (Mohanty 1995). As this example shows, opening up a future, and attending to theongoing effects of a traumatic past, are only incorrectly under-stood as alternatives. A second set of problems with Brown’s critique of identity poli-tics emerge from what we regard as her tendency to individualise social problems as problems that are the possession and theresponsibility of the “wounded” group. Brown suggests that the problems associated with identity politics can be overcome through a “shift in the character of political expression and politi-cal claims common to much politicised identity” (1995: 75). She deﬁnes this shift as one in which identity would be expressed in terms of desire rather than of ontology by supplanting the lan-guage of “I am” with the language of “I want this for us” (1995:75). Such a reconﬁguration, she argues, would create an opportu-nity to “rehabilitate the memory of desire within identiﬁcatory processes…prior to [their] wounding” (1995: 75). It would fur-ther refocus attention on the future possibilities present in theidentity as opposed to the identity being foreclosed through its attention to past-based grievances.

# 1NR

### Impact

#### Not an answer to our impact claims about the way capitalism structures society – Capitalism render’s its victims anonymous by creating the necessary epistemological structures that enable bodies to be viewed objectively via their value to the liberal order – sweatshops in Bangladesh, mining operations in eastern Europe and Central Asia, and sex slavery globally exist daily and are not recognized because of the way that the ideology of capital structures thoughts and actions – the aff’s individual focus never materializes because while we are discussing how inclusion should occur in the liberal space of debate – this form of anonymization makes this thought process inevitable – that’s the Zizek and Daly evidence

### Alt

#### Our alternative is Marxism – we must begin from the position of attacking the material base of capitalism in order to actually break it down – it allows us to expose the material base of capitalism and challenge that – It best explains the 1AC

Regil 2004

 [Álvaro J. de Regil, Executive Director of The Jus Semper Global Alliance, “The Neo-Capitalist Assault in Mexico: Democracy vis-à-vis the logic of the market” *Sustainable Economic Development* February 2004 <http://www.jussemper.org/Resources/Economic%20Data/Resources/Neo-capAssaultMexico.pdf> ]

Structural Change Starting with Miguel de la Madrid, the PRI governments cease to be merely oligarchic, and they transform more properly into agents of the Consensus to impose and consolidate U.S. neoliberalism. Thus, with the direct connivance of the domestic power elite, the neo-capitalist assault is forged. The bet of the political elite and its twin, the business oligarchy, continues to be the same: to make themselves suitable to Washington’s new geopolitical interests, banking to benefit its very private interests on maintaining a centre-periphery partnership where they can continue to milk the country. Nevertheless, they are not just partners jointly exploiting with the North the natural and human resources of the country. They are now more properly agents in charge of imposing the economic structures dictated by the metropolis’ institutional investors for benefit of their multinationals (MNCs). This is a new North-South system, absolutely imperialist, that makes use of resources under a globally-integrated system that cuts across borders and includes and marginalises resources and inhabitants in the entire system, according to the national economic environments generating the maximum efficiencies, which in turn translates into the greatest possible shareholder values. In this system, the North-South borders become blurred, and the agents of the neo-capitalist assault are both the leaders of the G7 and those in the periphery. However, the agents in the South, due to their congenital weakness, are left only with the option of participating in the profits, depending on their capacity to generate the best efficiencies in infrastructure, in costs of commodities and of course in high-yield labour, for its extremely low cost and its operative dexterity at the industrial units of the MNCs. Those offering the best natural resources for exploitation, the best infrastructure and fiscal incentives and the best workers and most flexible labour legislation, will be the best bidders to attract foreign capital. Those who build the most sublime Darwinian ethos will be the winners. The aspirations of true development, of eliminating poverty, of social justice, of sovereignty, are absolutely frivolous and strictly remain as rhetoric for domestic consumption. The real thing is the savage competition of the business/political oligarchies of the countries of the South to attract capital and participate in the global system of exploitation. Kissinger said at the start of the government of Vicente Fox that globalization has its risks, perhaps 20% of the Mexican economy will be able to participate in the international system of multinationals. But the rest will continue to be marginalised and with no access to income, employment and the opportunities of globalisation.9 In this way, the new role of foreign agent of the Mexican elite becomes evident. Fiscally, the role is strictly as monetary regulator with high interest to contain inflation, depress demand and service the foreign debt by deepening the oil dependency of the economy. The role of balancing supply and demand is eliminated, and there is exclusive support for export supply; preponderantly the export of labour at misery prices through in-bond plants, which only export labour, for its local content is barely 2%. At the same time, the dismantling of the Welfare State and of programs against poverty is initiated. Between 1983 and 1988, the minimum wage falls 49%. Moderate and extreme poverty increase 33% and 23% respectively. Thus, the poor become the majority for the first time in many decades. The general subsidies on food are replaced by focalised aid, another of the commandments of neoliberalism, and the programs on extreme rural poverty are either reduced or completely eliminated. Clear regressive signs emerge, such as the increase in the incidence of infant mortality due to avitaminosis. The proportion of death cases due to fetal underdevelopment and malnutrition boom in absolute terms. Schooling indices drop for the first time in decades. The GINI inequality index increases from 47 to 53. 10

### Links

#### Multiculturalism – their overreliance on blurring the lines between identity categories allows capitalism to sustain itself – it masks the inherent contradictions in society and allows capitalism to shift and become fluid – That’s the Hames-Garcia evidence – Their Ortega evidence is emblematic of this shift – what does discussion of the immigrant’s memory do? How does that change the structural inequalities of the status quo – the Answer is that it doesn’t do anything except make invisible the structural contradictions of late capitalism

#### The adoption of the mestiza identity erases all cultural traditions and history where it becomes one disembodied metaphor anyone can claim – this is how capitalism operates – revolutionary potential is reduced and made open to consumption by the average consumer

Donadey 2007

(Anne, Department of European Studies and Women’s Studies at San Diego State University, “Overlapping and Interlocking Frames for Humanities Literature Studies: Assia Djebar, Tsitsi Dangarembga, Gloria Anzaldua,” College Literature, Fall, Volume: 34(4), p. 23.)

In an important essay on the centrality of Anzaldúa’s work, Yvonne Yarbro-Bejarano cautions against “universalizing the theor y of mestiza or border consciousness, which the text painstakingly grounds in specific historical and cultural experiences” (1998, 13) in order to preclude “[a]ppropriative readings” in which **everyone becomes a mestiza and difference and specificity are erased** (14; see also Phelan 1997; Castillo 2006). While I agree with Yarbro-Bejarano that what Emma Pérez (1999) would call Anzaldúa’s “decolonial imaginary” should not be flattened out by a post-modern translation of the concept of borderlands that would erase its historical and cultural grounding by turning it into a disembodied metaphor that all can come to claim, it is also important to remember that Anzaldúa’s Borderlands/La Frontera has at least two levels of address: one deals with the specificity of the Chicana/o history in the U.S./Mexican borderlands; the other seeks to make a space for Chicanas/os and others whose identities cannot be reduced to binaries in a variety of locations, including the academy. Anzaldúa’s first words in Borderlands/La Frontera emphasize this very multiplicity of addresses: “The actual physical borderland that I’m dealing with in this book is the Texas-U.S. Southwest/Mexican border. The psychological borderlands, the sexual borderlands and the spiritual borderlands are not particular to the Southwest.” (1999, 19). **Thinking of academic fields of study through the model of borders and borderlands is, I believe, a way to follow up on an important insight of Anzaldúa’s, rather than an appropriation of her work.**

#### The aff will be coopted in a similar way that the Zapatista Commandante Marcos has been commodified – Relying on identity markers as a form or resistance inevitably fails – The Ski mask was a form of cultural resistance that is now portrayed on billboards to sell condoms

McCowan 2003

[M. Clint, MFA from Indiana University, “Imagining the Zapatistas: Rebellion, Representation and Popular Culture”, International Third World Studies Journal and Review, Volume XIV]

Could it be that the popular images that the Zapatistas initially sold to the media now keep the rebels pinned down, in the public’s view, under a certain stereotype or representation? Has the commodification of such images held back the movement from having real agency? What is an authentic Zapatista? It seems that popular culture has had both an accelerating and braking effect upon the rebellion’s popularity. In a very real sense, the Zapatista movement has been co-opted by popular culture. What initially was their friend is quite possibly now their foe. Because the Zapatistas have been culturally appropriated and commodified in a wide array of merchandise—including t-shirts, buttons, refrigerator magnets, posters, ski-mask condoms, key chains, dolls, pens, and billboard advertisements, to name a few—they have become novelties or museum pieces for consumption. In the public imagination, the Zapatista experience has its place in time and space—it is static. Like the tourist destination that markets itself to the expectations and preconceived understandings of the tourist, the popular culture industry has created and designed the essential and authentic Zapatista for consumption in the public mind. It is ironic that the Zapatistas have feared and fought against being co-opted by the state, never thinking that they might be equally co-opted by popular culture. It is hard to say which is possibly their worse enemy; that is, which is more debilitating to their struggle. It seems fair to say that when the Zapatistas turned to the media to play up popular images of their movement they entered into a devil’s bargain. This bargain gave them international recognition and momentarily spared their movement. In the end, however, the image making spiraled out of their control in a frenzy of commodification. Of course, the violent swings in the Mexican economy during the nineties also exaggerated other national political and social issues and helped to push the rebels to the sidelines.

#### Language – The aff’s reliance on interrogating the ways that language creates and sustains the borderlands denies our revolutionary potential – that’s Ebert – only focusing on material structures allows us to break down capitalism – the Aff’s articulation of border creation through discourse and interrogation of memory as the starting point means we can never break down the actual structures of capitalism

#### The Poems of the 1AC are emblematic of the ways that language obfuscates the material bases – the borderlands are described as a discursive construction of identity that negates life – this ignores the ways in which that violence is structured by capitalism – Their Last Poem describes the way that discourse has shaped the borderland – that what is told to us becomes truth – that is what our Ebert evidence is describing

#### The 1AC cross-ex describes this link perfectly – their answer to the question what should happen is that “well that’s different for everybody” but our argument is that it isn’t – Capitalism exists globally and should be resisted universally – they merely obfuscate that material base by removing the revolutionary potential of Marxism\

### Fluidity

#### Their fluidity arguments are a link

Kevin Cryderman, “Jane and Louisa: The Tapestry Of Critical Paradigms: Hutcheon, Lyotard, Said, Dirlik, And Brodber,” 2000, http://65.107.211.206/post/caribbean/brodber/kcry1.html,

In "Borderlands Radicalism," Dirlik is critical of the trends of postmodernism and postcolonialism in regard to borders, subjectivity, and history. Dirlik claims that postmodernism and postcolonialism tend to simply reinforce the reign of late capitalism: Post-modernism, articulating the condition of the globe in the age of flexible production, has done great theoretical service by challenging the tyrannical unilinearity of inherited conceptions of history and society. The political price paid for this achievement, however, has been to abolish the subject in history, which destroys the possibility of political action, or to attach action to one of another diffuse subject positions, which ends up in narcissistic preoccupations with self of one kind of another. (89) Dirlik claims that the 'happy pluralism' of postcolonialism -- such as its emphasis on flux, borderlands and liminal space -- does not so much oppose elite unified narratives of nations and cultures as it does reinforce them. Dirlik also links this trend of "fluid subject positions" (98) in postmodernism to postcolonialism and Global Capitalism: "in the age of flexible production, we all live in the borderlands. Capital, deterritorialized and decentered, establishes borderlands where it can move freely, away from the control of states and societies but in collusion with states against societies" (Dirlik 87). Moreover, the problem "presented by postcolonial discourse" is "a problem of liberating discourse that divorces itself from the material conditions of life, in this case Global Capitalism as the foundational principle of contemporary society globally" (99). Dirlik also links the intellectual class as a product of global capitalism which, according to Dirlik, "has jumbled up notions of space and time" (100). Indeed, both postmodernist and post-colonialist literature involve the fragmentation and rebellion against modernist ideologies that impose essentializing identity, linear time schemes, and totalizing narratives.

### Perm

#### They don’t get a permutation – we have impact turned the basis of the ontology and method in the 1ac. This is not like a counterplan debate – method-based arguments necessitate a more philosophical conception of advocacy-competition – permutation would make a fundamental shift from the starting point of the 1ac.

#### Multiple starting points are bad:

#### a) destroys comparative of strategy – the fluid affirmative becomes an assimilation accommodation of the 1ac – ruins honing of strategy

#### b) decreases clash – makes debate a race to the affirmative since they speak first and last.

#### C – starting point debates are good – they have made an active commitment to selecting a certain political strategy means they should be willing to defend it unconditionally and with no amendments – they should not be afforded this grey area regarding their own advocacy

#### All of the Links are disads to including their method – anything else is severance and they should lose because we’d never win a link

### Non Comp

#### Not explained – no new explanation

### Last act

#### Obviously intrinsic – this debate is a question of starting points – the alt isn’t start a revolution which means the perm kills our ability to debate by adding something new that wasn’t included

#### Also not solve – all our links prove using the aff as a starting point is bad

### Alt supposes Borders

#### This argument doesn’t make any sense – if the alt assumes borders between revolutionaries and non-revolutionaries then so does the aff – immigrants and non-immigrants or racists and non-racists – it’s a dumb distinction that has no impact

#### The Alt solves best

Linder 10

[Kolja, Radical Philosophy, “Marx’s Eurocentrism: Postcolonial Studies and Marx Scholarship”, <http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/50/41/02/PDF/Lindner_Marx_Eurocentrism.pdf>, pg. 22-24, accessed 7-18-13,]

These continuities notwithstanding,¶ 124¶ the texts that grew out of Marx’s exchanges with ¶ Russian revolutionary movements bear witness to a politically reinforced version of his break ¶ with dimensions of Eurocentrism. First, Marx no longer premises the one-sided superiority of ¶ Western societies, but, rather, confirms ‘the economic superiority of communal property’.¶ 125¶ Second, his preoccupation with Russia cannot be dismissed as ‘imaginary investigation’ of a ¶ non-Western region of the world which only serves to buttress a European self-image. For behind Marx’s efforts here lies a long, careful examination of the issue of property relations ¶ in the extra-European world, as well as an endeavour to articulate capitalist penetration and ¶ local social conflict. On this basis, Marx’s appreciation of English colonialism in India undergoes sharp modification: what he once called the ‘double mission’ of destruction and renewal ¶ becomes, unambiguously, ‘vandalism’. Third, Marx no longer conceives of modernisation as ¶ ‘Westernisation’, which is to say that he no longer regards European development as the sole ¶ valid historical measure. Rather, it would appear that Russia is in many respects treated as a ¶ model of development for the West. Thus Marx affirms that the crisis of the Western-capitalist world will only be overcome with the ‘elimination’ of capitalism and ‘the return of ¶ modern societies’ to a superior form of ‘an “archaic” type of collective property’.¶ 126¶ As we ¶ have seen, Marx’s critical reception of authors such as Morgan, ‘one of the few people of his ¶ time to have conceived of progress along a number of different lines’¶ 127¶ , stands behind these ¶ developments. Even if recent research has shown that Marx’s ‘analysis of the Russian rural ¶ commune [is based] on altogether erroneous premises’, it does not follow that his ‘conceptual ¶ approach to them’ has lost all relevance: ‘At bottom, it is a question of the construction of ¶ human history. Here, Marx sketch of several different paths of development for human societies stands in sharp contrast to unilinear, evolutionistic notions’.¶ 128¶ Fourth, Marx meets the ¶ standards of global history. With his positive political attitude toward the Russian rural commune, he charts an explicitly non-Eurocentric orientation for a classless society: in communist ¶ perspective, Europe is reduced to a mere province. Marx does more than merely sketch a conception of communism that draws on many different experiences. He also conceives of an ¶ interaction between diverse areas of the world, one situated in the realm of the political: a ¶ revolution in Russia could become the ‘signal for a proletarian revolution in the West’, ‘so ¶ that both complement each other’.

### Presupposes Cap is worse

#### Their argument relies on them winning that Capitalism is the same as racism and sexism – our argument is that capitalism isn’t just simply a marker of oppression but it is foundational and it structures how other forms of oppression take place

Kovel, 2002 [Joel Kovel, Alger Hiss Prof. At Bard, 2002 The Enemy of Nature, Zed Books, p. 123-125]

If, however we ask the question of efficacy, that is, which split sets the others into motion, then priority would have to be given to class, for the plain reason that class relations entail the state as an instrument of enforcement and control, and it is the state that shapes and organizes the splits that appear in human ecosystems. Thus class is both logically and historically distinct from other forms of exclusion (hence we should not talk of ‘classism’ to go along with ‘sexism’ and ‘racism,’ and ‘species-ism’). This is, first of all, because class is an essentially [hu]man-made category, without root in even a mystified biology. We cannot imagine a human world without gender distinctions although we can imagine a world without domination by gender. But a world without class is eminently imaginable — indeed, such was the human world for the great majority of our species’ time on earth, during all of which considerable fuss was made over gender. Historically, the difference arises because ‘class’ signifies one side of a larger figure that includes a state apparatus whose conquests and regulations create races and shape gender relations. § Marked 12:38 § Thus there will be no true resolution of racism so long as class society stands, inasmuch as a racially oppressed society implies the activities of a class-defending state.’0 Nor can gender inequality be enacted away so long as class society, with its state, demands the super-exploitation of woman’s labour. Class society continually generates gender, racial, ethnic oppressions and the like, which take on a life of their own, as well as profoundly affecting the concrete relations of class itself. It follows that class politics must be fought out in terms of all the active forms of social splitting. It is the management of these divisions that keeps state society functional.